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CASE NOTES
The argument most commonly used in support of allowing interest was
clearly set forth in Fell v. Union Pacific R. Co., 14 which was a suit for
property damage:
Is there any reason why a person sustaining injury and damage to his property
from the negligent act of another should not receive just what he has lost as
nearly as may be accomplished in a court of justice? If a person's property is
destroyed or damaged, why is he not entitled to be compensated to the full
extent of its value in money so that he may replace the same with other property
of a like nature? If on the day of its injury or destruction he restores or replaces
it with his own money, why is he not entitled to interest on that money to the
date of repayment? If he had loaned the money to someone, he certainly would
be entitled to interest, and, if he borrowed it from someone, he would likely
have to pay interest for its use. By being awarded legal interest, therefore, he
is simply placed in statu quo, and nothing short of this is full compensation,
and that is just what the law aims to accomplish. 15
It may not be complimentary to a man to compare him with a chattel,
but to a widow who has lost the source of her support it is similar to a
man who has lost property essential to earning his livelihood.
The argument used in denying interest is, "... no interest could be re-
coverable because defendant knew not what, if anything, he should pay.
That was a rule of convenience.' 16
What authority there is does not appear to favor the allowance of in-
terest, even though it seems that the equities favor the allowance of inter-
est. However, one fact remains: The statute, under which the action was
brought, makes no provision for interest, and the statute generally con-
trols. The Stiles case appears to be a clearcut departure from this general
principle.
1432 Utah 101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907).
15 Ibid., at 106, 1005.
16 Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U.S. 163 (1933).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISTRICT COURT MUST
HAVE JURISDICTION OVER FIRST TRIAL
TO CONSTITUTE JEOPARDY
The defendants were convicted and sentenced for violating Section
4705 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.' In recasting the provisions of
the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, Congress inadvertently failed to provide
a penalty for the violation of this section. This omission was promptly
remedied by an amendment 2 but, prior to discovery of the error, the de-
1 26 U.S.C.A. §4705(a) (Supp., 1959) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
to sell, barter, exchange, or give away narcotic drugs except in pursuance of a written
order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on
a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the secretary or his delegate."
2 26 U.S.C.A. §7237 (a) (Supp., 1959).
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fendants violated the statute. Thereafter, the defendants asserted that their
sentences had been unlawfully imposed and sought their release by writs
of habeas corpus. The district court vacated the sentences and, upon its
own motion, vacated the convictions. The defendants were, a short time
later, indicted for the same acts, but under 21 U.S.C., Section 174.3 The
defendant's pleas of double jeopardy were overruled, the finding of the
trial court being that sentence is an additional element and, therefore,
constitutes a new and different offense. It was further ruled that jeopardy
did not attach because the defendants could not lawfully have been im-
prisoned in the initial proceeding.
In reversing the conviction, the court of appeals held that the 1954 Code
did confer jurisdiction upon the court and, therefore, conviction of the
defendants was valid. The court then declared that where there is a valid
conviction, a subsequent trial for the same offense will constitute double
jeopardy. This position was premised upon the propositions that the of-
fense did not cease to be a crime during the interim and that a conviction
results in certain serious consequences. United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d
206 (C.A. 2d, 1959).
The doctrine of double jeopardy had its origin in the ancient pleas of
autrefoits acquit and autrefoits convict, both of which were grounded
upon the principle that the life of no man was to be placed in jeopardy
twice for the same offense. Autrefoits acquit could be pleaded by a de-
fendant in any of the following situations: (1) When the defendant's
motion to quash the indictment was sustained; (2) when, upon trial, the
defendant was adjudged not guilty; and (3) when, upon appeal, the trial
court's ruling on the indictment was reversed, or the defendant's convic-
tion was reversed. In order to prevent the defendant from entering a plea
of autrefoits acquit in relation to indictments for homicide, the State
would postpone the trial for a year and a day. Since all appeals had to be
taken within a year and a day at common law, the defendant was barred
from raising this matter after a conviction. In order to remedy this un-
healthy situation, a statute was enacted which required the State to act
immediately upon the indictment, but it also removed indictments from
the plea of autrefoits acquit.4 The plea of autrefoits convict applied where
a 21 U.S.C.A. S174 (Supp., 1958) provides: "If any person fraudulently or know-
ingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under
its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or assists in so doing or receives, conceals,
buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of any
such narcotic drug after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have
been imported contrary to law, such person shall upon conviction be fined not more
than $5000 and imprisoned for not more than ten years. Whenever on trial for a viola-
tion of this section the defendant is shown to have or to have had possession of the
narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize convic-
tion unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
4 3 Hen. VII, c.l (1486).
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the defendant had been convicted of an offense and the State subsequently
attempted to indict him for the same offense.5
That these ancient doctrines will continue to be a safeguard against an
individual being subjected to prosecution twice for the same offense is
ensured by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
in the following words: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This concept is
predicated upon the theory that the State, with all of its power and re-
sources, should not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict a
man of the same crime. If allowed, the probability of an innocent
man being convicted would be increased with each new trial. A man
ought not to be required to live in a state of constant fear and anticipa-
tion which would be the result of such a procedure." However, as abso-
lute as the concept of double jeopardy appears, it is a personal defense
and, therefore, can be waived by the defendant, either expressly or im-
pliedly.7
In ascertaining whether a conviction violates the Fifth Amendment, it
is first necessary to consider two basic rules: (1) Jeopardy attaches "when
[the defendant] is put on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction upon
an indictment or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction, and a jury has been empaneled and sworn"8 and, (2) the
elements of proof required for each offense must be the same or convic-
tion of one does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the other.9
So strongly embedded in the conscience of justice is the maxim of dou-
ble jeopardy, that even the guilty must go free before the doctrine will be
compromised. 10 However, in determining whether or not Sabella was a
proper case for the application of double jeopardy, it is necessary to de-
termine whether the trial court had jurisdiction in the first instance.
On the federal level, a court, in order to take cognizance of a criminal
offense, must have had jurisdiction conferred upon it by a Congressional
statute." In United States v. Hudson,'2 the Court, in denying that a cir-
5 Cooley's Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Bk. 4, *335, 336
(4th ed., Andrews, 1899).
6 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. Gramer, 191 F.2d 741
(C.A.9th, 1951).
7Callahan v. United States, 35 F.2d 633 (C.C.A.10th, 1929); Brady v. United States,
24 F.2d 399 (C.C.A.8th, 1928).
8 Hunter v. Wade, 169 F.2d 973, 975 (C.A.10th, 1948).
9 Kendrick v. United States, 238 F.2d 34 (App. D.C., 1956); United States v. Perrone,
161 F.Supp. 252 (S.D. N.Y., 1958); United States v. Cooper, 143 F.Supp. 76 (N.D. Cal.,
1956).
10 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
"1 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933); United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343
(1878); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
1211 US. 32 (1812).
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cuit court of the United States had common law jurisdiction of libel, ad-
vanced the following test to determine whether or not that court has
jurisdiction: Congress must define the offense, provide for punishment,
and specify the court which shall have jurisdiction of the offense. If this
principle is absolute, there was no jurisdiction in the present case since
Congress failed to attach a penalty. Therefore, jeopardy did not attach
and the defendants' plea of double jeopardy should have been overruled.
The above theory is substantiated by two cases which are quite similar
to the instant case. In Mossew v. United States, a the defendant was con-
victed of violating a provision of the Food Conservation Act of 1917.
Congress failed to provide a penalty for this particular provision, but the
intent to create a crime was indicated by the use of the word unlawful in
the definition of the prohibited act. The court, in reversing the defend-
ant's conviction, held that a statute, although criminal in nature, which
failed to provide a penalty was a nullity. In United States v. Evans,14 al-
though the factual situation was somewhat different, the court arrived at
the same conclusion reached in the Mossew case.
In the Sabella case, the court relied heavily upon a case decided by the
Georgia Court of Appeals. 15 There it was held that a statute which failed
to provide a penalty did confer jurisdiction upon the court and, therefore,
a valid conviction did result. However, that case is weak in that it is
predicated upon a prior case which held an indictment valid and then
stated that it would not consider whether or not the statute provided a
penalty. 16 Further, the Georgia decision is in conflict with the decision of
all other states which have decided the question, these states having held
that a statute which fails to prescribe a punishment is a nullity. 17 These
cases were all propounded upon the principle advanced by the Hudson
case and various definitions of a crime.
The decision of the Sabella case is contra to the weight of authority,
both on the state and federal level. Its only point of distinction from the
aforementioned cases rests in the fact that a similar provision of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code did provide punishment and, therefore, was a
crime. However, when a statute is repealed, it is as if it had never existed
in relation to future acts which, under its provisions, would have consti-
13266 Fed. 18 (C.C.A. 2d, 1920).
14 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
M Jenkins v. State, 14 Ga. App. 276, 80 S.E. 688 (1914).
16 Kimbrough v. State, 101 Ga. 583, 29 S.E. 39 (1897).
17People v. Freres, 171 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1958); Redding v. State, 165 Neb. 307, 85
N.W.2d 647 (1957); Osborn v. Borchetta, 20 Conn. Sup. 163, 129 A.2d 238 (1956);
Ex parte Ellsworth, 165 Cal. 677, 133 Pac. 272 (1913). Accord: Rosenbaun v. State,
4 Porter 599 (Ind., 1853). See Smallman v. Gladden, 206 Ore. 262, 291 P.2d 749 (1955);
New Orleans v. Stein, 137 La. 652, 69 So. 43 (1915); Cribb v. State, 9 Fla. 409 (1861).
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tuted punishable crimes.18 Consequently, the principle established by this
case, if accepted by other courts, will create an unmerited extension of
the doctrine of double jeopardy and allow the guilty to go unpunished
because of a technicality.
18 United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88 (1870).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INDIANA HABITUAL CRIMINAL
STATUTE NOT PUNISHMENT FOR STATUS
Petitioner was found guilty of the offense of vehicle taking and sentenced
to a term of from one to ten years. In compliance with the Indiana Habitual
Criminal Act,1 petitioner, having twice previously been convicted and
imprisoned for felonies, was sentenced to life imprisonment. At a hearing
on the petition for habeas corpus, completion of the one to ten year term
was averred and petitioner contended that the life sentence was punish-
ment for a status of criminality rather than for a crime. It was insisted
that since all Indiana convicts were subject to hard labor,2 continued im-
prisonment under the life term would constitute involuntary servitude in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.3 The district court dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals, for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, affirmed the dismissal of the petition. United States v. Dowd, 271
F.2d 292 (C.A.7th, 1959).
Historically, the habitual criminal statutes in the various states have
often been attacked on constitutional grounds, 4 but have almost invaria-
bly been sustained by the courts. 5 Among the more forceful assertions
against constitutionality have been arguments that these statutes evoke
cruel and unusual punishment, denial of due process and/or double jeop-
ardy. In answering the cruel and unusual punishment argument, the
courts have pointed out that this phrase as used in the Constitution refers
to physical torture and not to duration of time that a convicted criminal
is to spend imprisoned. 6 In refuting the denial of due process argument,
the Supreme Court has held that the imposition of a heavier penalty under
these Acts is not per se violative of due process.7 In rebutting the double
jeopardy argument, the Supreme Court has maintained that the heavier
1 Ind. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§ 9-2207, 9-2208.
2 Ind. Rev. Stat. (1956) § 13-238.
3 U.S. Const. Amend. XIII.
4 E.g., State v. Mead, 130 Conn. 106, 32 A.2d 273 (1943); State v. Zywicki, 175 Minn.
508, 221 N.W. 900 (1928); State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 103 Pac. 27 (1909).
5 But cf. Goeller v. State, 119 Md. 61, 85 At. 954 (1912).
6 E.g., Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 748, 265 S.W. 339 (1924).
7 Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
